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NOTES

sufficiency of evidence to be a basis for annulment of a judgment.30 In both cases the defendant is given an opportunity
to contest the evidence brought. The requirement that evidence in executory proceedings be in authentic form is apparently a safeguard to assure the judge that the plaintiff is entitled to bring the action and to protect against enforcement of
fabricated claims in defraud of the debtor's rights. Thus where
failure to comply strictly with the requirement is not accompanied by fraud on the court or the debtor, there seems little
reason to allow a subsequent annulment on such grounds.
If carried to its logical extreme, the trend set by the application of the Viley dictum in Doherty and Tapp may lead to
a widespread practice of annulling judicial sales on minor
formal irregularities some time after the sale is completed.
Such a result would appear to be undesirable in prolonging
litigation 3 ' and adversely affecting the stability of judicial
sales and land titles.3 2 This danger seems to outweigh whatever
public interest there may be in protecting a debtor who has
negligently failed to protect himself. It is submitted that in a
suit brought by the debtor insufficient authentic evidence and
other such minor formal irregularities should be grounds for
annulling executory proceedings only when accompanied by
fraud or lack of notice to the debtor which excuses his failure
to appeal from or enjoin the sale.
George A. Kimball, Jr.
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Plaintiff, a Florida milk distributor, challenged orders of
the Florida Milk Commission which regulated sales between
30. That insufficiency of evidence is not ground for annulling a judgment
was held in Emuy v. Farr, 125 La. 825, 51 So. 1003 (1910).
31. This was one of the reasons given by Judge LeBlanc for his judgment
in the district court for defendant in the instant case. 158 So. 2d at 232.
32. Although in the instant case an automobile was involved, in Doherty
a sale of real estate was annulled. Even in a situation like Doherty, where
the property at the time of the action in nullity remains in the hands of the
mortgagee-adjudicatee who is charged with knowledge of the defect in the executory proceedings, annulment of the sale could do substantial damage to the purchaser if he has put improvements on the property or is using it for business
purposes. In absence of fraud on his part it seems an unreasonable penalty to
require him to give up the property merely because of a formal irregularity
in the executory proceedings.
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producers and distributors, alleging that they violated the com-

merce clause of the United States Constitution. Pursuant to
its statutory authority, the Commission had devised a threepronged regulatory scheme which allocated the higher-priced
beverage milk sales' to producers in the Pensacola Milk Marketing Area ;2 milk purchased from other states was thus relegated

to the less remunerative nonbeverage utilizations. 3 A threejudge district court held the regulatory scheme to be a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. 4 The United States

Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Held, a state regulatory
scheme which pre-empts a local market for its producers is
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce which cannot be justified as an economic measure to protect the welfare
of local dairy farmers or as a health measure to insure an ade1. Subject to minor adjustments for butterfat content, the price paid producers for milk of substantially the same quality is determined by the form in
which the milk is ultimately consumed. Since milk consumed in the fluid form
commands a substantially higher price than identical milk sold in manufactured
forms, such as butter, cheese, ice cream, and so forth, the distributor is willing
to pay the producer a higher price for the milk which the distributor will sell
in the fluid form. See Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 84 Sup. Ct.
378, 380 & nn. 2-3 (1964).
2. First, the Commission set minimum prices to be paid producers in the
marketing area; beverage milk (Class I) drew a substantially higher minimum
price than milk destined for other utilizations (Classes II, III, and IV). Second,
the Commission established a system for allocating the top-priced sales to the
Pensacola producers first. During three months each year-the base fixing
period-an earned base was determined for each Pensacola producer which represented the ratio of the milk delivered to a distributor by the Pensacola producer to the total milk supplied by all Pensacola producers to that distributor.
Since only Pensacola producers were included in determining the earned base,
the total of the earned bases for Pensacola producers equalled 100%. A producer's earned base was then applied to the distributor's Class I requirements
to determine the number of gallons for which that producer must be paid the
Class I price. This procedure was then employed for Classes II, III, and IV
respectively, until the producer's deliveries to that distributor were exhausted.
Should the deliveries by a producer be insufficient to utilize his quota of Class I
sales, the excess was prorated to the other Pensacola producers. Thus the Pensacola producers were assured the Class I price for their milk unless their supply
exceeded the distributor's Class I requirements, in which event they had top priority on each succeeding class. This effectively precluded competition with milk
from other states, relegating it to the less remunerative utilizations not exhausted
by Pensacola producers. Third, the obvious loophole in this scheme was plugged
by the statutory prohibition against termination or modification without just
cause of a distributor-producer relationship established by a continuous course
of dealings; that the Commission's minimum prices were burdensome or that
the milk was available elsewhere at lower prices was not just cause.
3. Polar had purchased approximately 30% of its requirements in Florida;
the remaining 70% came from Alabama, Mississippi, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Missouri, Virginia, and Illinois, Before the Commission's orders, Polar had paid
the minimum Class I price of 61 cents per gallon to Pensacola producers for a
specified quantity of their milk and 35.5 cents per gallon for any amount over
that quantity. The price of milk from other states varied, but as surplus milk
at distress prices it could be purchased for as low as 30 cents per gallon.
4. 208 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Fla. 1962).
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quate local supply of milk.5 Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 84 Sup. Ct. 378 (1964).6
The dairy industry is fraught with the dangers of destructive competition.7 Whether a state may exercise its police power
to alleviate this evil when such action necessarily involves some
transgression into the realm of interstate commerce has been a
reoccurring problem since the early thirties. Although authority
over interstate commerce has been committed to Congress by
the commerce clause,8 there are areas where in the absence of
5. The instant case involved two other very interesting points. Polar sold a
substantial quantity of milk to United States military bases; it contested the
application of the Florida producer prices to this milk on the ground that such
price-fixing was inconsistent with federal procurement regulations. The court
held that Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963) had declared only distributor
price-fixing in conflict with the procurement regulations, and had not reached the
producer price question. The court again refused to reach this issue, finding
that it was not clear on the record whether the minimum price schedule for
Florida producers was applicable to this military milk.
In the other point, Polar challenged a provision of the Florida Milk Control
Act which imposed a tax of 15/100 of 1 cent on each gallon of milk distributed
by a Florida distributor "for the privilege of continuing in or engaging in the
business of distributing milk or acting as a distributor." FLA. STAT. § 501.09(4)
(1961). Polar claimed that imposing this tax on milk distributed to military
bases violated the principles laid down in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302
U.S. 134 (137), and Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242 (1934), that
the state had no interest to tax in the facilities of the United States or upon the
activities conducted within these facilities. The court sustained the Florida tax,
finding it incident to the activity of processing or bottling milk in a Florida
plant and not upon work performed on or the sale or delivery in a federal enclave.
6. Polar's victory in the instant case may only be a moral one. The Florida
courts have upheld the revocation of Polar's license issued by the Milk Commission on the grounds that Polar's president demonstrated a "persistent purpose not to respond to the authority vested in the Florida Milk Commission . . .
[and] has arrogantly followed this course with full knowledge of the potential
consequences upon his business enterprise." Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 155 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. App. 1963). After the revocation was upheld
and Polar's license had expired by its terms, the Commission obtained an injunction restraining Polar from continuing to operate as a milk distributor. At this
time Polar has appealed but has been denied supersedeas. Polar Ice Cream &
Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 159 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 1964).
7. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934). The dangers of
destructive competition are greatly heightened by its tendency to interfere with
the rigid sanitary requirements of the dairy industry.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes; .... ." See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10: "No state shall, without
the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ...
"
In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court, in holding
that market quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act applied to appellee's
23-acre wheat crop, defined the vast source of congressional power contained in
the commerce clause. "But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indiredt.' " Id. at 125. (Emphasis added.) This statement
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concurrent federal legislation the state may act to remedy a
problem primarily of local concern provided such action does
not substantially impede the free flow of interstate commerce.0
In the series of cases discussed below the Supreme Court has

severely restricted the scope of permissible state action against
destructive competition in the dairy industry. 10

Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc.," was the first assault based
on the commerce clause 12 against a state milk regulation aimed
laid to rest any contention that production, manufacturing, and mining activities
were not within the ambit of the commerce clause because they were local activities and could only indirectly affect commerce.
9. "Although the commerce clause conferred on the national government
power to regulate commerce, its possession of the power does not exclude all
state power of regulation. Ever since Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
2 Pet. 245, and Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been recognized
that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of
power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it." Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945).
"But ever since Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, the states have not been
deemed to have authority to impede substantially the free flow of commerce from
state to state, or to regulate those phases of the national commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any,
be prescribed by a single authority." Id. at 767.
"For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the
commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some
protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce and that in
such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature,
is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state
and national interests." Id. at 769.
"There has thus been left to the states wide scope for the regulation of
matters of local state concern, even though it in some measure affects the commerce, provided it does not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across
state lines, or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity of
regulation is of predominant national concern." Id. at 770.
10. The Court has not been tolerant with attempts at economic isolation in
other areas of commerce. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (South
Carolina not permitted to require owners of shrimp boats fishing off its shores
to dock at a South Carolina port to unload, and stamp their catch with a tax
stamp before shipping out-of-state) ; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278
U.S. 1 (1928) (Louisiana not permitted to require that heads and hulls of shrimp
be removed from shrimp taken in Louisiana waters before shipment to other
states); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (Washington not permitted
to require common carriers to be licensed in order to control competition on the
highways) ; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (West Virginia
not permitted to require that West Virginia natural gas be used to satisfy local
needs before any sold in other states). See also Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16
(1928) ; Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). But see Sligh
v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) ; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349 (1908) ; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
11. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
12. In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court had sustained a New York
wholesale and retail price-fixing regulation against due process and equal protection attacks. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See also Borden's
Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936) ; egeman Farms Corp.
v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934). But 8ee Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,
297 U.S. 266 (1936).
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at destructive competition. New York prohibited the sale of
milk obtained from other states unless the producer had been
paid the minimum price set for New York producers. Although
such regulation unquestionably would be necessary for totally
effective producer price regulation without a concomitant decrease in local sales, it also undoubtedly imposed an economic
barrier against competitive interstate milk sales. 13 The court
found that such power over interstate commerce had expressly
been denied the states and given to Congress for the chief purpose of preventing such economic barriers. 14 Acknowledging
that nice distinctions had been drawn between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce, the court found them
inapposite where the avowed purpose of the regulation was to
5
suppress competition from other states.1
In Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products,16 however, the court partially reinstated the nice distinction by holding that one purchasing milk in Pennsylvania for distribution
in other states could be required to be licensed and to pay minimum prices to local producers; such regulation was directed at
local conditions and does not violate the commerce clause merely
because it "incidentally or indirectly involves or burdens inter17
state commerce.'
13. Mr. Justice Cardozo, delivering the opinion of the court, found that the
New York regulation "set a barrier to traffic between one state and another as
effective as if customs duties, equal to the price differential, had been laid upon
the thing transported." 294 U.S. at 521. Out-of-state milk was actually placed
at a competitive disadvantage due to the increment in cost from transportation
expenses.
14. Citing several noted research sources, the court recognized that "a chief
occasion of the commerce clause was 'the mutual jealousies and aggressions of
the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation.'
Id. at 522.
15. lbid.
16. 306 U.S. 346 (1939). In the interim between Baldwin and Eisenberg
the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute authorizing a commission to establish minimum and maximum wholesale and retail prices. Highland Farms Dairy
v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937). The Supreme Court found that the regulations
did not apply to milk produced out of the state and sold in Virginia to its
distributors until the milk was resold in Virginia; and in that case, they applied
only to the resale price. Therefore there was no burden on interstate commerce.
17. Id. at 351. Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler dissented,
concluding that the regulations constituted an unconstitutional burden. Although
Eisenberg sold his milk in New York City, the Court relied to some degree on
the overall small fraction of Pennsylvania milk shipped out of state. This in
conjunction with a finding that buying of milk is an "essentially local" activity,
was held to justify "the conclusion that the effect on the law on interstate commerce is incidental and not forbidden by the Constitution, in the absence of regulation by Congress." Id. at 352-53. Some cases have relied heavily on the relative size of the interstate business to strike down a state statute. See, e.g.,
Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922). However, Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), made it abundantly clear that the state may regulate
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Any relaxation of Baldwin's rigid approach which glimmered
under Eisenberg was extinguished by H. P. Hood & Sons v.
DuMond.'5 The New York Commissioner of Agriculture and
Markets had denied Hood, a Boston distributor, a license to
establish an additional processing plant in the Greenwich area
because it would tend toward destructive competition by increasing the cost of handling at other plants in the area and by
depriving local markets of the supply necessary during the
short seasons. The majority, resting firmly on the sweeping
language of Baldwin, held that the commerce clause prohibited
any economic restraints on interstate commerce for local economic advantage. 19 The dissent of four Justices evidenced a
sharp schism in the approach of the members of the court
toward state economic regulation.2 0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
disagreed that regulation of interstate commerce to prevent
destructive competition was per se unconstitutional; he suggested that the case be remanded for additional evidence to
determine whether the impending danger of destructive competition was so great and the burden on interstate commerce so
slight that the commissioner's ruling fell within the area where
in the absence of federal regulation it is more important to protect local interests than to leave interstate commerce completely
unfettered. 2 1 Mr. Justice Black's dissent further denounced the
majority position as a displacement of this firmly established
balancing-of-interests principle with a previously rejected mechanistic formula born out of unwarranted fears of balkanization or bureaucracy.2 2 The commerce clause does not immunize
local phases of interstate commerce from state laws against
destructive competition unless under the circumstances the necessity for a free flow of commerce outweighs the state's interest.
"local"

activities

(processing

and packing of raisins)

regardless of relative

amount of the object regulated ultimately destined for interstate commerce (95%).

18. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
19. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, referred to Baldwin as
"an explicit, impressive, recent and unanimous condemnation by this Court of
economic restraints on interstate commerce for local economic advantage." Id.

at 535.

On the other hand, the court approved the Eisenberg decision as an

"incidental" burden. Id. at 530.
20. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Mr.
Justice Rutledge. Mr. Justice Black wrote a separate dissenting opinion concurred in by Mr. Justice Murphy.
21. "I cannot agree in treating what is essentially a problem of striking a
balance between competing interests as an exercise in absolutes." 336 U.S. at 564.
22. Mr. Justice Black had reference to the liberality with which the court
had applied the Cooley doctrine despite cries for restraint from some members of

the court. He cited Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390 (1941) for particular
emphasis. Id.

at 554.
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In Baldwin where the state in effect reached beyond its bounds
to set producer prices in other states, he felt the balance clearly
weighed against the regulation, but in Hood where the local
interest was so compelling and the burden on commerce so slight,
23
he would sustain regulation.
Two years later in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,2 4 the majority
held that an alleged health ordinance, which discriminated
against interstate commerce by requiring all milk sold in
Madison to be pasteurized in inspected plants within five miles
of the city, could not stand when reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives were available. Although they assumed the ordinance had a legitimate health purpose and therefore did not
treat it as a direct economic regulation, the majority held that
the Baldwin conception of the commerce clause precluded any
nonessential economic isolation. 25 Mr. Justice Black's dissent
evidenced an even more tenacious adherence to the balancingof-interests principle when economic barriers were erected for
26
protection of health.
In the wake of this sharp division of the court in Hood and
Dean, the instant case follows with an express and unanimous
endorsement of the principles of the Baldwin case. The court,
quoting extensively from Baldwin, emphasized that the commerce clause envisioned a federal free trade area devoid of
economic barriers and reprisals among the states, and that any
attempt to reserve local markets for local producers or to protect local producers from out-of-state competition was inimical
to this concept whether it be an economic measure to protect
the welfare of local producers or a health measure to assure an
23. Id. at 557.
24. 240 U. S. 349 (1951).
25. "In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry
against competition from without the State, Madison plainly discriminates against
interstate commerce. This it cannot do, even in the exercise of its unquestioned
power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives . . . are available. [Citing Baldwin and Minnesota v. Barber,
136 U.S. 313 (1890).] A different view, that the ordinance is valid simply
because it professes to be a health measure, would mean that the Commerce
Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action other than those laid down
by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance where a state artlessly
discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods." Id. at
354.
26. Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Minton concurred, attacked the "premises, reasoning, and judgment" of the Court.
They asserted that the ordinance did not exclude wholesome milk from other
states, that it was not a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce, and that
no alternative was suggested which "beyond a reasonable doubt" would not lower
the Madison health standards below those under the present ordinance. Id. at
357-60.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

adequate local milk supply. 27 The court expressly approved the
Dean and Hood cases and distinguished Eisenberg as involving
an indirect burden on interstate commerce incidental to an essen28
tially local activity.
The unanimity in the instant case appears to mark an aban-

donment of the minority position favoring a broad application
of the balancing-of-interests principle in the area of economic
regulation. 29 Perhaps the Florida regulatory scheme was so

flagrantly insupportable even under balancing-of-interests criteria that it did not merit a concurring reaffirmation of that
principle. However, in view of the court's endorsement of the
Hood and Dean cases, it appears that the court has crystallized

its position. Under the commerce clause a state may not reserve
local markets for local producers or protect local producers from
out-of-state competition; this power is exclusively within the
federal domain. On the other hand, nondiscriminatory economic
regulation, aimed at neither reserving local markets nor protecting local producers from out-of-state competition, falls within the province of the state's police power when such regulation
is incident to a local activity.3 0
27. Quoting from Baldwin, the Court said: " 'Let such an exception be admitted and all that a state will have to do in times of stress and strain is to
say that its farmers and merchants and workmen must be protected against competition from without, lest they go upon the poor relief lists or perish altogether.
To give entrance to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national
solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union not division.'" 84 Sup. Ct. at 386.
28. The Court further found no basis for an assertion that Congress had
acquiesced in or consented to this kind of state regulation. In Lehigh Valley
Cooperatives Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 370 U. S. 76 (1962), the Court held
that the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act had expressly been denied the power to erect similar regional trade barriers
in the milk industry. The Court in Polar expressed doubt that Congress, in
denying the power to the Secretary of Agriculture, had intended to grant it to
the states. The Florida regulations also discriminated against Florida milk
outside the Pensacola Milk Marketing area. It is well settled that such discrimination within the state is immaterial to the determination whether the
regulation burdens interstate commerce. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S.
349, 354 & n. 4; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 82-83 (1891).
29. It should be noted that the only member of the court who dissented in
both Hood and Dean was Mr. Justice Black. Mr. Justice Rutledge and Mr.
Justice Murphy who dissented in Hood were no longer on the Court when Dean
was rendered. Mr. Justice Douglas who dissented in Dean had not become a
member of the Court when Hood was decided. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
dissented in Hood, sided with the majority in Dean, while Mr. Justice Minton
made the reverse switch. The change of position made by these last two Justices
illustrates the difficulty of the decision which the Court must make between the
interests of the state and the nation as a whole, particularly where the health
factor is strongly involved as in Dean.
30. The state's power to fix minimum and maximum wholesale or retail milk
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The unanimous position reached by the court that a state
is powerless to reserve or protect its local markets is sound. Any
inroad into this concept no matter how justified by a balance of
interests would open the door to trade barriers and other economic retaliation among the states. The commerce clause stands
for the proposition that economic prosperity lies in a federal
common market and not in the state as an independent trade
unit. It may well be that Florida producers require a large
share of the Florida beverage milk sales to be financially stable,
but this may be equally true for producers from other states
who sell milk in Florida. By virtue of the commerce clause, the
decision whether the plight of the dairy industry requires that
the interests of out-of-state producers be subordinated to those
of local producers should be committed to Congress where the
needs of the dairy industry of the nation as a whole are represented, and not to the individual states who are clearly incapable
of impartial resolution of such conflicting economic interests.
William Shelby McKenzie
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Plaintiff newspaper imported newsprint from Canada, maintaining an average inventory equal to a thirty-five day supply.
prices is well settled. Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S.
346 (1939); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937). The
distance between the permitted economic regulation in Eisenberg and the prohibited one in Hood is close and gives the best indication of the outer barrier for
state regulation. A state may enact reasonable legislation to alleviate a local
evil even though it places some burden on interstate commerce, provided it does
not discriminate against that commerce-i.e., provided it places an equal burden
on all intrastate commerce as well. The producer price-fixing scheme in Eisenberg
required all instate and outstate purchasers to pay the minimum price. But
when the regulation goes one step further and attempts to curtail interstate
commerce to stimulate intrastate commerce or curtail both interstate and intrastate commerce to protect commerce in one area of the state, then the regulation
must fall under the commerce clause. In Hood the state tried to protect the
Greenwich area processors by excluding other New York and out-of-state
processors.
For a thorough discussion of the many ways in which a state may use its
sanitary regulations as an economic barrier, see Hutt, Restrictions on the Free
Movement of Fluid illilk under Federal Milk Marketing Orders, 37 U. Det. L. J.
525, 541-53 (1.960). Even though the court appears to have reached a solidary
position on economic regulation, it will still have to tangle with the balance-ofinterests in situations in which the state has discriminatory sanitary regulations.
At least when nondiscriminatory alternatives are available, the state cannot erect
such barriers. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See Minnesota
v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891).
But see Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).

